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INTRODUCTION
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory .... 1
Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann
remains apt today, particularly when viewed through the prism of
America's developing health care crisis. As health care costs rapidly
rise,2 state and federal deficits increase,3 and the uninsured rolls
swell,4 the importance of finding new avenues for public and private
funding of health care assistance becomes increasingly salient.
In keeping with long-standing tenets of federalism, in recent
years several states have taken the lead in trying to solve some of
health care's impending difficulties.5 One prevailing notion has
been to use "pay or play" legislation' to shift some of the burden of
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. For a thorough discussion of the increase in health insurance premium prices, see
Kaiser Family Found., Snapshots: Comparing Projected Growth in Health Care Expenditures
and the Economy, May 2006, http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm05O206oth2.cfm.
3. See ELIZABETH C. McNICHOL & IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
STATE BUDGETS: ON THE EDGE? (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/5-4-06sfp.pdf (discussing the often
unstable, sometimes dire nature of many state fiscal budgets); Letter from Peter R. Orszag,
Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon. Robert C. Byrd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Appropriations (Mar. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7836/03-02-
PrelimAnalysis.pdf (stating the CBO's estimate that the federal deficit, under the President's
budget, will total $226 billion, or 1.6 percent of GDP in 2008).
4. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF UNINSURED AMERICANS
CONTINUED To RISE IN 2004 (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/8-30-05health.pdf (noting how U.S.
Census Bureau data from 2004 showed that 45.8 million Americans were without health
insurance, up from 45 million in 2003 and 39.8 million in 2000).
5. See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder (RILA II), 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir.
2007) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("Innovative ideas for solving the [Medicaid] funding crisis are
required, and the federal government, as the co-sponsor of Medicaid, has consistently called
upon the states to function as laboratories for developing workable solutions." (emphasis
added)); Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland's "Wal-Mart"Act: Policy and Preemption, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 847, 874 & n.125 (2006) ("It is a truism of contemporary federalism that states should
serve as laboratories of experimentation.").
6. For a survey of the landscape of "pay or play" bills entered into state assemblies in
2006, categorized by state, bill number, number of employees/mandated percentage, status,
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financing health insurance to the private sector through America's
competitive, efficient, and highly imaginative capitalist economy.'
One such state is Maryland, whose General Assembly passed a
statute8 in January 2006 requiring all for-profit, non-governmental
employers with more than 10,000 employees in the state to spend
at least 8 percent of total payroll wages on health insurance costs
for employees.9 Any noncompliant employer that fell under the
purview of the "Fair Share Health Care Fund Act" ("Fair Share Act"
or "FSA" or "the Act") was required to pay the state the difference
between the percentage of their health care expenditures and the 8
percent rate required by the law.1° Any revenues collected from the
assessment were to be deposited into a special fund that would be
used to supplement the State's Medicaid program.'1
FSA opponents, primarily in the retail and commerce communi-
ties, dubbed the Act the 'Val-Mart Law" because the three other in-
state employers to which the law could apply were exempted for
reasons explained below. 2 The Retail Industry Leaders Association
challenged the Fair Share Act in federal court, alleging that the Act
sponsor(s), and date of introduction, see Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n, Pending State Health
Care Mandate Matrix, http://www.retail-leaders.org/new/resources/matrix.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2008).
7. Already four states (Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Hawaii) have attempted to
secure near universal health coverage for their citizens. See Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, 2007 Universal Health Care Legislation: Health Reform Bills, http://www.ncsl.
org/programs/health/universalhealth2007.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). In January 2007,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California proposed a $12 billion plan to provide health
coverage for all of the state's 36 million residents. See Jennifer Steinhauer, California Plan
for Health Care Would Cover All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at Al. If approved, the plan would
extend Medi-Cal, the State's Medicaid program, to children as well as to adults who earn as
much as 100 percent above the federal poverty line. See id. In addition to requiring 2 percent
or 4 percent revenue contributions from doctors and hospitals, respectively, another provision
of the plan would require businesses that choose not to offer health coverage to pay 4 percent
of their total Social Security wages to a state fund created to subsidize the purchase of
coverage by the working uninsured. See id. The cost of such coverage would be measured on
a sliding scale depending on what an employee earned; and, employees would be able to pay
for it using pre-tax dollars. See id. For the official proposal, see GOVERNOR'S HEALTH CARE
PROPOSAL (2007), http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/GovernorsHCProposal.pdf.
8. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2007).
9. For non-profit companies, the benchmark was 6 percent of total payroll wages. Id. §
8.5-104(a).
10. Id. § 8.5-104(b).
11. Id. § 8.5-107(3) ('The secretary shall ... (3) pay the revenue from the payroll assess-
ment into the fund created under § 15-142 of the Health-General Article.").
12. See infra Part I.A.
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was preempted by federal law. 3 A federal district court held that
the Maryland Fair Share Act was preempted by the federal
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 4
and the court's decision was upheld on a 2-1 ruling by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in early 2007."5
This Note examines Maryland's preempted statute and the
United States District Court case that granted its opponents
declaratory relief. After reviewing the Fair Share Act, the federal
ERISA statute,16 and the significant changes in Supreme Court
jurisprudence concerning ERISA preemption in the past decade,
this Note will offer new approaches through which states can modify
the analytical framework outlined by the Fair Share Act to achieve
improvements in the state financing of Medicaid through large
private employers.17 The goal of this Note is to analyze ways to fit
future fair share legislation within the non-preempted confines of
ERISA.
The proposed modifications include: (1) rewriting fair share laws
as unequivocal, non-regulatory Medicaid taxes from which compli-
ant employers may become exempt; 8 (2) dulling the sharp edge of
the FSA's punitive texture by decreasing the 100 percent shortfall
tax to 35-50 percent; 9 (3) a state-initiated higher minimum wage for
very large employers, with an incentivized exemption provision
allowing an employer to revert back to the higher of the state or
federal government's general minimum wage if the employer
spends a certain percentage of payroll wages on employee health
insurance;2° (4) expanding employers' options for "outlets" that
meet the 8 percent health expenditure benchmark, such as through
an increase in non-medical fringe benefits, which would give the
13. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder (RILA 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006).
14. Id. at 484 (citing ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006)). When ERISA became law in
1974, it was codified as part of Title 29 of the United States Code. Although it may be
correctly cited solely by its U.S.C. provisions, it can also be cited solely by its specific ERISA
provisions. For purposes of clarity, this Note will cite both.
15. RILA II, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision, see infra Part III.C.
16. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006).
17. See infra Parts IV-VII.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part V.C.
20. See infra Part VI.A.
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statute a less coercive feel;2 and (5) a "total package" benefits
approach analogous to unpreempted ERISA prevailing wage cases.22
Part I of this Note will describe the legislative history and
passage of the Maryland Fair Share Act, as well as Wal-Mart's role
in the retail sector nationally and in Maryland specifically. Part II
will provide a brief background of ERISA. Subsections within Part
II will discuss early Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding ERISA,
as well as the Court's interpretive changes to ERISA since the
landmark Travelers decision in 1995. Part III treats RILA v. Fielder
(RILA 1), giving particular attention to the rationale employed
by Judge Frederick Motz with respect to the Tax Injunction Act
and ERISA preemption. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's 2-1
affirmance (RILA II) will be briefly discussed.
Part IV introduces modifications for future "fair share" legisla-
tion, and Part V proposes an approach focused on rewriting the law
as a Medicaid tax, rather than a legislative regulatory mandate.
Part V stresses the importance of (1) the statutory language, (2) a
Medicaid financing purpose, (3) a reduction in the shortfall tax, (4)
the means of collection of the tax, and (5) the statute's legislative
record. Part VI then offers a second approach: the introduction of
employer size-specific minimum wages and "total package" benefit
statutes that provide additional incentivized means for employers
to meet their minimal expenditure requirements.
Finally, Part VII discusses a concern voiced by Judge Motz in
RILA I: the perceived strain on employers' reporting require-
ments and uniform plan administration. This Part argues that
large employers such as Wal-Mart, with a massive workforce and a
multitude of health insurance plan offerings, have regularly
collected, accessible payroll and personnel data, as well as a plan of
administration that cannot be described as uniform.
Lastly, the Note concludes by summarizing the approaches
described, and stressing the long-term federal interest in allowing
states to act as laboratories by shifting to the free market some of
the burden of grappling with enlarging Medicaid costs.
21. See infra Part VI.B.
22. See infra Part VI.B.2.
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I. THE MARYLAND FAIR SHARE ACT
A. The Law and Its Background
In 2005, the state legislature of Maryland passed Senate Bill
79023 and House Bill 1284,24 the "Fair Share Health Care Fund
Act."25 Though vetoed by Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., the
Maryland General Assembly overrode the veto on January 12,
2006,26 enacting the law that would have taken effect on January 1,
2007.27 The FSA created a fund to assist the operations of Mary-
land's Medicaid program 28-Maryland's public health insurance
program that is jointly funded by the states and the federal
government, and which serves eligible low-income parents, children,
seniors, and people with disabilities.29 The fund was created, in part,
as a response by the Maryland legislature after learning that
"between fiscal years 2003 and 2006, annual expenditures on
[Maryland's Medicaid and children's health programs] increased
from $3.46 billion to $4.7 billion."3
The FSA's fund was to be replenished through a health care
"payroll assessment" on large employers who did not spend at
least 8 percent of their total payroll on health insurance costs.3'
Underpaying employers with more than 10,000 in-state employees
32
were required to pay the difference between their payroll health
insurance costs and the 8 percent target set by the statute.33 The
23. S.B. 790, 2005 Leg., 420th Sess. (Md. 2005).
24. H.B. 1284, 2005 Leg., 419th Sess. (Md. 2005).
25. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2007).
26. See John J. Sweeney & Fred Mason, Letter to the Editor, Wal-Mart's Agenda, WASH.
POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A20.
27. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-103(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007). Because the FSA was
held preempted in July 2006, the law was never enacted.
28. Id. § 8.5-107(3); see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (LexisNexis 2007).
29. See Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Fact Sheet for Maryland and United States,
http://www.statehealthfacts.orgtmedicaid.jsp (follow '"MD" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11,
2008). For an excellent statistical analysis of health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid
expenditures in all fifty states as compared to the United States as a whole, see id. (select the
state to compare from the drop down box and click "Go").
30. RILA II, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
31. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
32. Id. § 8.5-102.
33. Id. § 8.5-104(b).
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FSA also required such employers to report annually to the
Secretary of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation their total number of
in-state employees, the amount spent by the employer on health
insurance, and the percentage of payroll spent by the employer on
health insurance costs.3 4 As defined by the FSA, "health insurance
costs" included payments for "medical care, prescription drugs,
vision care, medical savings accounts, and any other costs to provide
health benefits35 as defined in § 213(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 36
In Maryland, only four employers have 10,000 or more employees:
Johns Hopkins University, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Giant
Food Inc., and Wal-Mart. Northrop Grumman was exempt because
it had successfully lobbied for a FSA provision permitting employers
to exclude, for purposes of calculating the percentage of payroll
spent on healthcare, compensation paid to employees above the
state's median household income.37 Johns Hopkins, a nonprofit
organization, met the lower 6 percent benchmark set by the FSA for
nonprofits," and Giant Food Inc.'s health care expenditures already
exceeded 8 percent of the total wages it paid to its in-state employ-
ees.
39
The only institution affected by the Fair Share Act was
Bentonville, Arkansas-based Wal-Mart Stores Inc., which employed
14,301 individuals in Maryland according to the FSA's 2005 General
Assembly Fiscal and Policy Note .4 The Fiscal and Policy Note (FPN)
commented that some states claim that:
[M]any Wal-Mart employees end up on public health programs
such as Medicaid. A survey by Georgia officials found that more
than 10,000 children of Wal-Mart employees were enrolled in the
state's children's health insurance program (CHIP) at a cost [to
the State] of nearly $10 million annually. Similarly, a North
34. Id. § 8.5-103.
35. Id. § 8.5-101(d).
36. Id. (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 213(d) (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
37. See id. § 8.5-103(b); RILA 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md. 2006).
38. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104(a) (LexisNexis 2007).
39. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
40. SEN. LAWLAH et al., MD. DEP'T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND PoLIcY NOTE (REVISED),
S.B. 790, at 3 (2005), available at http:llmlis.state.md.us/2005rs/fnotesbil_0000/sbO790.pdf
[hereinafter FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE].
1866 [Vol. 49:1859
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Carolina hospital found that 31% of 1,900 patients who said they
were Wal-Mart employees were enrolled in Medicaid, and an
additional 16% were uninsured.4
The FPN reflects the view held by many that, as the largest private
employer in the United States, providing work for over 1.36 million
people in 4,091 stores,42 Wal-Mart should not set subpar standards
in labor practices and wages. Many argue that Wal-Mart has
done just that.43 In Maryland alone, at the end of fiscal year 2004,
Wal-Mart paid its 14,301 employees $270 million in total wages,
while Giant Food paid $536 million to its 18,902 employees.44 A
2003 Harvard Business School study estimated that Wal-Mart spent
an average of $3,500 per employee per year on health insurance,
whereas the average spending per employee in the wholesale/
retail sector was $4,800, and $5,600 per employee for U.S. employ-
ers in general. 45 As the FPN also notes, "Wal-Mart officials say the
company provides health coverage to about 537,000 people [nation-
wide], or 45% of its total work force. As a matter of comparison,
Costco Wholesale provides health insurance to 96% of eligible
employees. 46
Although focused on Wal-Mart as the quintessential "very large"
employer, this Note genuinely does not intend to malign that
company. Rather, Wal-Mart and its employee health care policies
are being cited because Wal-Mart is an example of the type of
41. Id. at 2.
42. See Wal-Mart Facts, United States Operational Data Sheet-August 2007, http:l
www.walmartfacts.com/articles/523l.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
43. See Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, Bus. WK., Oct. 6,
2003, at 100, 102 (stating that average wages for full-time Wal-Mart associates in fiscal year
2001 were less than $14,000 per year, despite a federal poverty line of $14,630 for a family
of three). In Maryland, the average wage for regular, full-time hourly associates is $10.26 per
hour. See Wal-Mart Facts, Maryland Community Impact, http://www.walmartfacts.coml
StateByState/?id=20 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Maryland Community Impact].
44. FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, supra note 40, at 3. As of February 2008, the total number
of Wal-Mart associates in Maryland was 17,806. See Maryland Community Impact, supra note
43.
45. See Pankaj Ghemawat, Stephen Bradley & Ken Mark, Wal-Mart Stores in 2003, at 13
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Case Study 9-704-430, rev. Jan. 30, 2004); see also Bernard Wysocki, Jr.
& Ann Zimmerman, Wal-Mart Cost-cutting Finds a Big Target in Health Benefits, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 30, 2003, at Al (reporting that Wal-Mart spends 40 percent less on health benefits
per covered employee than the average for all U.S. corporations).
46. FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, supra note 40, at 3.
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company whose behavior "pay or play" legislation, like the Fair
Share Act, is intended to influence. Although Wal-Mart is the only
applicable large employer in Maryland that pays less than 8 percent
of payroll wages towards health insurance, other states have
similarly large employers. 47 The important point is that, in passing
legislation such as the FSA, state legislatures have begun to
announce that employers whose policies have unfavorable effects on
state public health insurance budgets may now be expected to
mitigate the resulting situations by either paying more to their
employees' health insurance, or by paying more to the state to offset
the cost to the state's Medicaid funds-and by proxy, its taxpayers.
To fully understand the contentious reaction of some to the
Maryland Fair Share Act and, more broadly, to any state attempt to
require employers to augment their health care expenditures, one
must understand the pervasive influence of ERISA, the federal
statute intended to solely regulate how employer health benefit
plans operate.
II. EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
(ERISA)
A. The Law and Its Background
ERISA is a complex federal statute designed to "supersede any
and all State laws"'48 that "relate to ' 49 employee benefit plans
(EBPs). By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of U.S. Constitution
Article VI, Congress may, by statute, expressly preempt state law.5 °
An expansive, voluminous piece of legislation, ERISA deals with the
administration of "employee pension benefit plans" and "employee
47. For a listing of the largest for-profit and nonprofit employers in each state, see
America's Career Info Net, http://www.acinet.org/acinet/selectstate.asp (last visited Mar. 10,
2008) (select a state from the list; press continue; follow the hyperlink under State
Information, "Largest Employers"). For example, in Colorado, Allstate Insurance Co. employs
17,000 workers; in New York, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. employs 15,000 workers; and, in
Pennsylvania, Motorola, Inc. employs 12,000 workers. Id.
48. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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welfare benefit plans."51 The statute itself defines an "employee
welfare benefit plan" as:
[A] ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereaf-
ter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness .... 52
ERISA was initially enacted to "protect ... the interests of partici-
pants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries" by setting
out substantive regulatory requirements for EBPs and to "provid[e]
for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts."53
ERISA's purpose was thus to provide a predictable, uniform reg-
ulatory regime over employee benefit plans. To this end, Congress
included broad preemption provisions54 that were intended to
ensure that EBP regulation would be "exclusively a federal con-
cern."55 ERISA imposes a variety of administrative requirements on
employee welfare plans with respect to such matters as reporting,56
disclosure,57 participation and vesting requirements," funding
standards,59 and fiduciary responsibility."° Although the statute
does not regulate the terms of employee benefit plans, it does
preempt their regulation by state or local governments.61
51. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006).
52. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
53. Id. § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
54. See id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
55. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
56. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2006).
57. Id.
58. Id. §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
59. Id. §§ 301-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
60. Id. §§ 404-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
61. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 894
(3d ed. 2000).
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B. Early Supreme Court Interpretation of ERISA
1. Health Benefit Mandates
In the first two decades after ERISA's passage, the Supreme
Court took a very narrow view of the extent to which state laws
could survive ERISA preemption challenges. Throughout the late
1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court adopted such a broad view of
ERISA that preemption of state statutes became essentially
routine." One discernible "trigger" for preemption came from state
laws that mandated health care benefits.63 In Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines,64 the Court held that § 514(a) of ERISA65 preempted state
laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans. The Court found that
a law "relates to" an EBP if "it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan."6
Consequently, the Court in Shaw found the New York Human
Rights Law67 forbidding EBPs from discriminating on the basis of
pregnancy, as well as the Disability Benefits Law,6" requiring
employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work
because of pregnancy or other non-occupational disabilities,
sufficiently "related to" employee benefit plans such that they were
struck down.69 The Shaw Court did, however, sow a discrete, yet
important, jurisprudential seed that would later take on increased
significance:
Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding
that the law "relates to" the plan .... [This case] does not present
a borderline question, and we express no views about where it
would be appropriate to draw the line." °
62. See id. at 892.
63. See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995).
64. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
66. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
67. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982).
68. N.Y. WORKERS' CoMP. LAW §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1965).
69. See id. at 96.
70. Id. at 100 n.21 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also District of Columbia v.
Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n. 1 (1992) (holding that ERISA preempts state
1870 [Vol. 49:1859
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Although vague, this aspect of the Shaw holding would figure
prominently in the Court's reasoning in the later Travelers
decision.7 '
C. The New Paradigm: The Travelers, Dillingham, and De Buono
Trilogy
The lessons gleaned from the trilogy of Supreme Court ERISA
preemption cases from the late 1990s are instructive and factor into
some of the proposals for future fair share legislation set forth in
this Note.72 For this reason, a brief overview of each case is helpful
to analyze present ERISA jurisprudence and to discuss potential
fair share modifications.
1. Travelers
If Supreme Court case law for the first two decades following
ERISA's enactment may be described as broad in its preemptive
scope, then precedent from the last twelve years must be described
as more nuanced and less reflexive. One watershed 1995 case in
particular "narrow[ed] [the Court's] interpretation of the scope
of ERISA preemption" and "adopted a pragmatic approach" to
determining whether a state law "relates to" an employee benefit
plan.73 This case, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. (Travelers), 7 established a
new framework for preemption analysis because, in the words of
Justice Souter, the Shaw analysis did not give the Court "much help
[in] drawing the line" for where the phrase "relates to" ends.75
In Travelers, the unanimous Court examined a New York
statute76 that required hospitals to collect surcharges on hospital
bills from patients covered by commercial insurers, but not from
and local workers' compensation laws that require employers who provide health insurance
for their employees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for injured employees
eligible for workers' compensation benefits).
71. See infra Part II.C.1.
72. See infra Parts V & VI.
73. Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1466-68 (4th Cir. 1996).
74. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
75. Id. at 655.
76. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b) to (c) (McKinney 2007).
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patients insured by Medicare or Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield
(BC/BS) plans. Many of the commercial insurance patients had
insurance purchased through employee health care plans that were
governed by ERISA.77 The statute also subjected most health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) to surcharges that varied with
the number of Medicaid recipients that they enrolled. 8 The revenue
collected by these 9 percent to 24 percent surcharges was used to
subsidize the State's Medicaid program.79
The Court began its analysis by stating clearly that questions of
preemption must start with the presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state law.80 Because preemption claims turn on
Congress's intent, the Court examined ERISA's language and
history. Justice Souter remarked:
The governing text of ERISA is clearly expansive.... [O]ne might
be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether the words of
limitation ("insofar as they ... relate") do much limiting. If
"relate to" were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would
never run its course, for "[r]eally, universally, relations stop
nowhere." But that, of course, would be to read Congress's words
of limitation as mere sham, and to read the presumption against
pre-emption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the
matter with generality.8 '
The Court rejected any argument that the New York statute
"related to" an employee benefit plan by the "reference to"8 2 factor,
because the surcharges were imposed upon patients and HMOs
regardless of whether the commercial coverage was secured by an
ERISA plan. 3
The Court next took up whether the statute "related to" an EBP
through a "connection with"' such a plan. Stating that "[f]or the
77. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650.
78. Id. at 649.
79. Id. at 650.
80. Id. at 654.
81. Id. at 655 (internal citations omitted).
82. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
83. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
84. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
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same reasons that infinite relations cannot be the measure of
pre-emption, neither can infinite connections.""5 The Court declared
that it had to "go beyond the unhelpful text [of § 514(a)] and the
frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state
law that Congress understood would survive."8
Noting that a primary goal of ERISA's passage was "to ensure
that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law,"87 and thus "minimize the administrative and financial
burden of complying with conflicting directives among States,"" the
Court differentiated the New York surcharge statute from prior
preemption cases.
Noting that even though the surcharges from which BC/BS plan
holders were exempt exerted an "indirect economic effect" on
commercial insurance buyers and ERISA plans-by making BC/BS
more attractive competitively-the Court significantly held that:
An indirect economic influence, however, does not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself.... Nor does the indirect
influence of the surcharges preclude uniform administrative
practice ... if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply bears on the
costs of benefits and the relative costs of competing insurance to
provide them. It is an influence that can affect a plan's shopping
decisions, but it does not affect the fact that any plan will shop
for the best deal it can get, surcharges or no surcharges. 9
As such, although the surcharges had an indirect economic influence
on ERISA plans, they were not preempted by ERISA because they
neither sufficiently "related to" employee benefit plans nor adopted
"acute"9 ° schemes of coverage that effectively restricted an ERISA
plan's choice of insurers.
85. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 668.
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Justice Souter concluded his analysis in Travelers by writing
that to read § 514(a)'s9" preemption provision as nullifying all state
laws that affect the costs and charges of EBPs, simply because they
"indirectly relate"92 to ERISA plans, "would effectively read the
limiting language in § 514(a) out of the statute, a conclusion that
would violate basic principles of statutory interpretation"93 and go
against the previously enunciated principle that "[p]re-emption does
not occur ... if the state law has only a tenuous, remote, or periph-
eral connection with covered plans. 94 Having examined ERISA, the
Court found that "nothing in the language of the Act or the context
of its passage indicate[d] that Congress chose to displace general
health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
concern."
95
2. Dillingham
Building on its decision in Travelers, the Supreme Court further
refined its ERISA preemption analysis in California Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A.,
Inc. (Dillingham).96 In Dillingham, the Court dealt with a California
prevailing wage statute97 that required contractors on public works
projects to pay their workers the local prevailing wage-typically
the local union wage-except that apprentices in state-approved
apprenticeship programs could be paid less than the prevailing
wage.98
An employee benefit plan under ERISA includes apprenticeship
programs. 99 Despite this, under the California statute an approved
apprenticeship program did not necessarily need to be an employee
benefit plan, because the program's "costs [could] be defrayed out of
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
92. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983); District of
Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992)).
95. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.
96. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
97. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West 1989).
98. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 319.
99. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
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that employer's general assets."'0 0 Thus, because the prevailing
wage law was facially and technically "indifferent"' 1° to the funding
of the apprenticeship program and any ERISA coverage, Justice
Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, found that the statute did
not make "reference to" ERISA plans.0 2
Turning next to the question of whether the wage law had a
"connection with" ERISA plans, the Court found that "in every
relevant respect, California's prevailing wage statute [wa] s indistin-
guishable from New York's surcharge program. '' ° Like New York
hospital surcharges in Travelers, the Court believed that the wages
paid on state public works projects had long been regulated by the
states °4 and that the wages to be paid to apprentices on such
projects were quite remote from the areas of reporting, disclosure,
and fiduciary duty with which ERISA is expressly concerned.' 5
Reiterating the view from Travelers that a reading of ERISA
preemption supplanting "traditionally state-regulated substantive
law in those areas where ERISA has nothing to say would be
'unsettling,"' 6 the Court held that the lack of positive indications
from Congress that it intended to supersede the states' historic
police powers was sufficient to sustain the law.
07
The Court also found that the statute's effect-a wage differential
that made state-approved apprentice program members economi-
cally more attractive to employers because of their lower labor
costs--did "not bind ERISA plans to anything."' ' Justice Thomas
noted that the statute's effect on ERISA apprenticeship programs
was "merely to provide some measure of economic incentive to
comport with the State's requirements, at least to the extent that
those programs seek to provide apprentices who can work on public
works projects at a lower wage."'0 9 The Court stated that the "added
100. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 326.
101. Id. at 328.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 330.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 330-31 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 665 (1995)).
107. Id. at 331.
108. Id. at 332.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
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inducement created by the wage break"'10 was not demonstrated to
be "tantamount to a compulsion upon apprenticeship programs,"'''
and thus the law was legal.
3. De Buono
The final case in the Travelers trilogy is De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical and Clinical Services Fund (De Buono)."2 De Buono dealt
with a state statute" 3 that imposed a tax on gross receipts for
patient services at hospitals, residential health care facilities, and
diagnostic treatment centers."' The tax applied equally to medical
centers that were owned and operated by an ERISA plan. The
revenue raised from the tax, called the Health Facility Assessment
(HFA), would become part of the state's general revenues.'15
According to the Court, the statute came about because, in 1990, the
New York General Assembly was "faced with the choice of either
curtailing its Medicaid program or generating additional revenue to
reduce the program deficit,""' 6 a choice similar to Maryland's today.
The New York General Assembly chose the latter."7
The respondents in the case were the trustees of a fund that
administered a self-insured, multi-employer welfare benefit plan,
and which owned three medical centers."8 Respondents argued that,
because they paid HFA assessments totalling $7,066 based on their
hospitals' patient income of $1,177,670, the law "related to" the fund
within the meaning of § 514(a) of ERISA, 119 and was therefore
preempted, as it applied to the practice of hospitals being run by
ERISA plans. 20
The Court was unpersuaded. Again citing the "historic police
powers of the State[,] includ[ing] the regulation of matters of health
110. Id. at 333.
111. Id.
112. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
113. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-(1)(a) (McKinney 1997).
114. De Buono, 520 U.S. at 809-10.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 809.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 810.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
120. De Buono, 520 U.S. at 810.
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and safety,"'' Justice Stevens found that the Health Facility
Assessment was a revenue raising measure that clearly operated in
a field traditionally occupied by the States.122 The Court did not find
that the Respondents had met their "considerable burden of
overcoming the 'starting presumption that Congress does not intend
to supplant state law."'1 2 The state tax on hospital gross receipts
was likened to the state laws of general applicability in Travelers
and Dillingham, which "impose [d] some burdens on the administra-
tion of ERISA plans but nevertheless d[id] not 'relate to' them
within the meaning of the governing statute. ' 24
Finding that the HFA was a tax on hospitals, most of which are
not owned by ERISA plans or funds, the Court declared that "[a]ny
state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits
to covered employees will have some effect on the administration of
ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law
with such an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute."'25 As such,
the state tax that was intended to raise revenue for New York's
Medicaid program was held to be valid.'26
With this discussion of historic and recent Supreme Court ERISA
jurisprudence in mind, contextualizing the Maryland General
Assembly's passage of the Fair Share Act over Governor Ehrlich's
veto is now possible. Likewise, the rationale and legal reasoning
employed by Judge Motz in RILA P" are now understandable
within the ERISA preemption framework outlined by the High
Court.
121. Id. at 814.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)).
124. Id. at 815.
125. Id. at 816. The Court also found that:
As we acknowledged in Travelers, there might be a state law whose economic
effects, intentionally or otherwise, were so acute 'as to force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice
of insurers' and such a state law 'might indeed be pre-empted under § 514.' That
is not the case here.
Id. at 816 n.16 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 816.
127. 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006).
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III. RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASSOCIATION V. FIELDER
On July 19, 2006, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland held in RILA P2 that the Maryland Fair Share Act was
preempted by the federal Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.129 Two major issues posed by the Maryland law-the
federal Tax Injunction Act and ERISA preemption-were treated in
the opinion. 30
A. Tax Injunction Act
The court's discussion of taxes and regulatory fees is germane to
any future prescriptive offering to other states about how to
structure "pay or play" legislation. Maryland argued that the FSA's
"payroll assessment" was in fact a "payroll tax" on covered employ-
ers. It did this, seemingly, because of the Tax Injunction Act'3 l
(TIA). In its entirety, the Tax Injunction Act reads: '"The district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.' 32 Because
Maryland state courts could serve as an adequate forum for a "plain,
speedy and efficient remedy," the State argued that the Fair Share
Act was a payroll tax in order to, in the words of Judge Motz, "strip D
this [federal] court of jurisdiction to hear the case.' ' 133
Although the court ultimately found that the Fair Share Act was
not a tax,' the reasoning employed by Judge Motz is nonetheless
instructive. In ascertaining whether the FSA was a tax-which
would trigger the Tax Injunction Act and remove the case to state
court-or a regulatory fee-which would not-the court looked to
prior case law dealing with attempts to differentiate between taxes
128. Id.
129. Id. at 494.
130. Judge Motz's discussion of standing and his dismissal of RILA's equal protection
discrimination claim will not be discussed, as they are beyond the scope of this Note.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
132. Id.
133. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
134. Id. at 492-93.
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and regulatory fees.135 The court cited an opinion by then-Chief
Judge Stephen Breyer stating that:
The classic "tax" is imposed by a legislature upon many, or all,
citizens. It raises money, contributed to a general fund, and
spent for the benefits of the entire community. The classic
"regulatory fee" is imposed by an agency upon those subject to
its regulation. It may serve regulatory purposes directly by, for
example, deliberately discouraging particular conduct by making
it more expensive. Or, it may serve such purposes indirectly by,
for example, raising money placed in a special fund to help
defray the agency's regulation-related expenses." 6
Judge Motz additionally opined, "in close cases 'the most important
factor becomes the purpose behind the statute, or regulation, which
imposes the charge.' 1 37
The District Court found problematic the fact that, under the
FSA, the responsibility for collecting any payments from for-profit
employers not meeting the 8 percent "health insurance costs"
benchmark was placed upon the Department of Labor, Licensing,
and Regulation, instead of the state treasurer (here, the Comptroller
of Maryland).13 ' In the eyes of Judge Motz, "[tlhis [wa]s not merely
a formal matter," but rather it "reflect[ed] the underlying reality
that the potential assessment imposed by the Act ... [was] part and
parcel of a regulatory process designed to implement a health care
mandate."'3 9
The court reviewed whether the statute's purpose was to raise
revenue or to punish large employers. Looking to the legislative
history behind the Fair Share Act, in which no FSA sponsor ever
referred to the assessment as a "tax," and in which Wal-Mart
seemed to be targeted by certain legislators, the court concluded
that "the General Assembly neither intended nor contemplated that
135. Id. at 490-92.
136. Id. at 490 (quoting San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683,685
(1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)).
137. Id. at 491 (quoting Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 134 (4th Cir.
2000)).
138. Id. The treasurer or comptroller is typically the individual whose primary duty is to
collect taxes. See, e.g., Comptroller of Maryland's Homepage, Comptroller of Maryland Duties,
http://www.comp.state.md.us/comptroller/duties.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
139. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
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the Act would raise any revenue for the State. To the contrary, its
purpose was to force Wal-Mart to increase the level of its health
care benefits. ' 14' As such, Judge Motz held that the Fair Share Act
fell under the penumbra of a "regulatory fee," and, thus, the Tax
Injunction Act did not divest the federal court of jurisdiction.
B. ERISA Preemption
The District Court began its preemption analysis by stating that
it found that the FSA had a "connection with" an ERISA plan, and
was thus preempted on that basis.14 ' Judge Motz recalled from
Travelers that "the main objective of ERISA's preemption clause is
to 'avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nation-
ally uniform administration of employee benefit plans. '"4
The court found that the Fair Share Act created health care
spending requirements that were either not applicable for multi-
state employers in other jurisdictions, or came into conflict with fair
share legislation in other states. 4 1 It held that the "intended
effect"' 4 of the FSA was to "force Wal-Mart to increase its contribu-
tion to its health benefit plan, which is an ERISA plan, and the
actual effect of the Act will be to coerce Wal-Mart into doing so.' 45
Asserting that the State of Maryland "over-read" the Travelers
trilogy on which it relied, Judge Motz said he found nothing in those
cases suggesting that the Supreme Court "would now uphold a state
statute or local ordinance mandating that an employer provide a
140. Id. at 493.
141. Id. at 494.
142. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995)).
143. Id. at 494-95; see, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 506(c)(2) (2006);
SuFFoLK CouNTY, N.Y., REG. LOCAL LAW § 335-3(A) (2006) (requiring Wal-Mart to spend an
amount annually on health care, as determined by an administrative agency); H. FILE 3143,
84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2006) (calculating total wages, from which an employer's
minimum spending level is determined, with reference to Minnesota's median house income);
H.B. 2678, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006) (providing for an almost identical regime to
Maryland's Fair Share Act; not yet voted on at the time of this writing); see also supra note
7 for a listing of fair share laws circulating in state legislatures during 2006.
144. RILA 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
145. Id.
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certain type or monetary level of welfare benefits in an ERISA
plan.' 46
To specifically refute any analogy to the statutes described in
the Travelers, Dillingham, and De Buono cases, the District Court
argued that these cases "lie at the periphery of ERISA analysis, not
(as does the Fair Share Act) at its core."'47 After briefly describing
the state laws at issue in those cases, Judge Motz contrasted them
with the Fair Share Act. He contended that the FSA was "not
merely tangentially related to ERISA plans but [wa]s focused upon
them." '148 Drawing upon the FSA's legislative history, Judge Motz
said that the law was targeted directly at a single employer's
ERISA plan, the effect of which was direct because it would require
Wal-Mart to increase its in-state health care benefits and adminis-
ter its plan in a manner that would ensure that the statutory
spending required by the FSA was met. 49 This was seen as violating
ERISA's purpose of providing for uniform national benefits and
administration.
The District Court of Maryland also took issue with the State's
argument that the Fair Share Act was not a mandate. Although the
Secretary maintained that employers could comply with the law
without increasing its health care benefits by (1) contributing to
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), (2) spending 8 percent of payroll
on first aid facilities (as allowed in the FSA's text), or (3) simply
paying a sum equaling 8 percent of payroll wages to the State
without increasing health care expenditures, the court was not
swayed. 5 ° Faulting the HSA proposal because the employees must
initiate these accounts, rejecting the first aid facilities suggestion as
unrealistic, and saying that the payment of equal funds to the State
rather than employees would be irrational,' Judge Motz viewed
the Fair Share Act as "imposing a substantive mandate"'52 that had
a "connection with"'53 an ERISA plan, and was thus preempted.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 496.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 497-98.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 497.
153. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
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C. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision
In many ways, the opinion and dissent in the Fourth Circuit's
RILA II15' decision were merely a rehashing of the respective
arguments of Wal-Mart and the State of Maryland. In his affirming
opinion for the Circuit, Judge Niemeyer wrote that "[a] state law
that directly regulates the structuring or administration of an
ERISA plan is not saved by inclusion of a means for opting out of its
requirements."'55 This dispatched with the notion that just because
affected employers had the option of not paying higher amounts to
their employees' ERISA-governed plans but instead paying the
difference to the State, the FSA represented a non-coercive choice
that did not implicate ERISA. Further, arguing that the Fair Share
Act specifically targeted Wal-Mart, the majority found that unlike
Travelers and Dillingham, the Maryland law in question "directly
regulate[d] employers' structuring of their employee health benefit
plans. This tighter causal link between the regulation and employ-
ers' ERISA plans ma[de] the Fair Share Act much more analogous
to the regulations at issue in Shaw and Egelhoff, both of which were
found preempted by ERISA."'
156
Judge Michael's dissent, however, found the Act to be an appro-
priate and legal response by the State to "wrestl[e] with explosive
growth in the cost of Medicaid."'57 For the sole dissenter in this 2-1
decision, the fact that the FSA offered covered employers the option
of paying an assessment into a state fund to support Medicaid, thus
offering a means of compliance that did not impact ERISA-because
an ERISA plan technically did not need to exist to comply with the
law-was determinative. 5 ' Judge Michael was likewise unper-
suaded by the argument that the Act would impede large employers'
154. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
155. Id. at 192 (citing Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2001) (holding that ERISA
preempted a Washington State law voiding the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of
a nonprobate asset, such as a life insurance plan, if the plan was governed or related to
ERISA)).
156. Id. at 195-96.
157. Id. at 198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 201 ("An employer can comply with the Act either by paying assessments into
the special fund or by increasing spending on employee health insurance. The Act expresses
no preference for one method of Medicaid support or the other. As a result, the Act is not
preempted by ERISA.").
[Vol. 49:18591882
2008] OF STATE LABORATORIES AND LEGISLATIVE ALLOYS 1883
ability to administer ERISA plans, because the FSA did not dictate
a plan's system for processing claims, paying benefits, or determin-
ing beneficiaries,159 and because the Act's reporting requirements to
the secretary were normal calculations of the cost of benefits and
the number of payees employers such as Wal-Mart already regularly
recorded.
IV. MODIFICATIONS FOR FUTURE "FAIR SHARE" LEGISLATION
Having reviewed ERISA, the Fair Share Act, and the federal
district court case that tackled the two, this Note will now turn to
the ways in which other states can draft legislation that avoids
some of the pitfalls of Maryland's ill-fated statute. As delineated by
Judge Motz in RILA I, sometimes the pitfalls were relatively minor:
suspect aspects of the legislative record, or the title of the individual
whose job was to oversee the collection of revenues. Other times, the
deficiencies were more serious: unrealistic alternate avenues for
non-health insurance expenditures or uniform administration of
plans. The following Parts seek to offer potential remedies to some
of the ailments endemic in the Fair Share Act, in hopes of elucidat-
ing for other states how to craft workable fair share legislation.
V. APPROACH #1: REWRITE THE LAW AS A MEDICAID TAX, NOT A
REGULATORY MANDATE
The first approach to writing such legislation in a manner that
avoids ERISA preemption combines the creation of a Medicaid tax
with a judicious legislative record, a specified tax revenue collector,
a system of incentivized tax credits, and a reduction in the shortfall
tax.
A. Statutory Language and Medicaid Financing Purpose
Under this first approach, future laws hoping to influence
employer health care spending must be unambiguously written as
Medicaid taxes falling within an "area 0 traditionally subject to local
159. Id. at 202.
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regulation":160 the financing of public health programs. In this
regard, the language and purpose of the statutes must evolve from
the Fair Share Act's current position. They can no longer be written
as legislative regulatory mandates, implicitly designed to force
employers to increase health care benefits; they must instead be
written to genuinely aid in the funding of state Medicaid budgets
and low-income health insurance programs. Achieving this funda-
mental step through a revenue-raising tax, and correctly using the
language necessary to do so, will greatly alter the interpretation and
feel of these laws.
First, the vagueness of terms like "payroll assessment" must be
eliminated, replaced with clear language that removes the specter
of the gray area between a tax and a regulatory fee. A "Medicaid
tax" is not only semantically more direct, but it is also a better
description of the law's true purpose, in keeping with Judge Motz's
view that "the most important factor [is] the purpose behind the
statute, or regulation, which imposes the charge."' 1
The Medicaid tax is designed to ease the burden and facilitate the
state's traditional police power to provide for the health and safety
of its citizens, and, as such, its only concern must be raising general
revenues for the state's Medicaid funds. Moreover, a Medicaid tax
for revenue-generating purposes is also much more likely than a
payroll assessment to trigger the Tax Injunction Act if challenged, 162
potentially keeping jurisdiction of the lawsuit in state court.
Second, such laws must contain a tax credit and a specific
exemption provision for employers that would prefer to comply with
the Medicaid tax indirectly by investing in employee health care
what they would otherwise pay to the state. Again, the credit and
exemption provisions are merely alternatives to the law's main
thrust, which is to serve as a revenue-raising Medicaid tax. For
instance, one iteration of this scheme would be an across-the-board
Medicaid tax of 10 percent of total payroll wages paid by in-state
employers with 10,000 or more employees, to be paid directly to the
160. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 668 (1995).
161. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting Valero Terrestrial Corp. v.
Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 134 (4th Cir. 2000)).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). See supra Part III.A. for a discussion of the Tax Injunction
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state's Medicaid budget. Every employer must consequently pay 10
percent of total payroll wages to the state to satisfy the universal
Medicaid tax, but a tax credit could be applied for each percentage
that the employer spent on individual employees' health insurance
instead. It is thus an option, rather than the transparent require-
ment, that existed in the Fair Share Act.
Under this scenario, an employer who spends 4 percent of its
payroll wages on employee health insurance costs would have an
automatic 4 percent tax credit, leaving the employer to pay 6
percent more to the State to meet the Medicaid tax requirement. 
163
Likewise, an employer who already spends 10 percent of total
payroll wages on health insurance costs would opt out of the
Medicaid tax by virtue of its tax credits and thus be exempt. The
exemption provision should not, however, be the statute's explicit
aim. It must be secondary, existing only to allow employers to
generate good will with their employees if they so choose, rather
than directly paying the tax to the state, as the law requires.
B. Legislative Record and Collection of the Tax
In RILA I, Judge Motz objected to the Wal-Mart references in the
Fair Share Act's congressional record and to statements evincing a
purpose other than that of raising revenue." These maladies are
easily fixable for future legislation. Firstly, General Assembly
members and any accompanying Fiscal and Policy Notes should
only refer to the bill as what legislators want state and federal
courts to consider it: a Medicaid tax. Secondly, the statute's text and
the lawmakers discussing it should never single out an individual
employer or a certain type of employer (beyond those of a specified
in-state workforce size). The actual class sizes for this kind of
legislation should be theoretically unlimited, in keeping with the
argument that "[a]n assessment imposed upon a broad class of
parties is more likely to be a tax than an assessment imposed upon
163. See infra Part V.C. for a discussion of the shortfall reduction, which would actually
decrease the remaining amount owed by the employer under the Medicaid tax if the employer
chose to spend it directly on employee health insurance costs.
164. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93.
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a narrow class.""16 Thirdly, states should consider setting bench-
marks for employers of other sizes, so as to dull the perception of
singling out only large employers. For example, a 3 percent
Medicaid tax rate could be applied to employers with fewer than
10,000 employees in the state.
Another significant modification that may appear at first to be
merely cosmetic is the legislative bill's path in committee. Judge
Motz expressed his concern that "the House of Delegates referred
the bill to the Committee on Health and Government Operations,
not to the Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over
'state and local taxation matters."'166 Consequently, lawmakers
should ensure that Medicaid tax legislation passes through only
those committees that deal with taxes. The Ways and Means
Committee, Budget and Taxation Committee, the Finance Commit-
tee, and their counterparts in different states, should take the lead
in drafting the Medicaid tax and performing markups. Moreover,
the law must be codified in the state tax code, rather than some-
thing such as the Labor and Employment Code, 67 to underscore its
purpose as a legitimate tax to raise revenue for the general public
benefit.168
Another important feature of the Medicaid tax is the determina-
tion of whose eventual responsibility it will be to collect the revenue
raised by the tax. In RILA I, the court noted that "[i]f the responsi-
bility for administering or collecting the assessment lies with the
general tax assessor, it is more likely to be a tax; if this responsibil-
ity lies with a regulatory agency, it is more likely to be a fee. 169
Pointing out that under the FSA the Secretary of Labor, Licensing,
and Regulation collected payments from non-compliant employers,
165. Id. at 491 (quoting Bidart Bros. v. Cal. Apple Comm'n, 73 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that an assessment was more like a regulatory fee because the impacted class was
limited to only California apple producers)). But see Antosh v. City of College Park, 341 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 568 (D. Md. 2004) (holding that a trash-collection charge was more like a tax
because the impacted class consisted of all people who lived in single-family rental homes or
apartments).
166. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 493 n.ll.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 492 (stating that "a court ordinarily asks whether ultimately the general
public will benefit from the revenue raised or whether the benefits 'are more narrowly
circumscribed"' (quoting Valero v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 134 (4th Cir. 2000))).
169. Id. at 491 (quoting Collins Holding Corp. v. Jasper County, 123 F.3d 797,800 (4th Cir.
1997)).
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Judge Motz found that this tended to demonstrate that the law was
part of a regulatory process. As such, states drafting Medicaid tax
legislation would be well-advised to vest the tax's collection powers
with the state treasurer or comptroller. These individuals would
then be responsible for transferring the income obtained from the
Medicaid tax into the state's respective Medicaid accounts.
With this necessary legislative language and critical features
framework in place, the important next step is a reduction in the
shortfall tax between the mandatory Medicaid tax threshold and the
amount an employer currently pays.
C. Reduce the Shortfall Tax
Under the Fair Share Act, an employer who did not meet the for-
profit 8 percent threshold was required to pay 100 percent of the
difference between the percentage of its actual total wages paid
towards health insurance and the 8 percent mark. In effect, as the
law was written, if Wal-Mart did not meet the 8 percent threshold,
it would then have to match the shortfall dollar-for-dollar, either to
its employees or to Maryland. For this reason, the RILA I court
found the regulatory mandate to be a "Hobson's choice,"'7 ° because
the law felt coercive and was not a real choice at all.
Concurrent with any Medicaid tax for financing the state's public
health assistance programs should be a reduction in the shortfall
tax. One possibility is a 35 to 50 percent reduction in the shortfall
tax that would indirectly encourage employers to invest their
Medicaid tax revenue in their employees rather than the state. As
such, whatever the difference is between the employer's present
percentage of health care expenditures and the benchmark percent-
age set forth in the Medicaid tax statute, the employer could either
pay the state 100 percent of the difference, or it could pay to its
employees 35 to 50 percent of the difference in the form of health
insurance costs.
For instance, as in the scenario described supra in Part V.A., for
a state with a Medicaid tax having a minimum threshold of 10
percent of total wages paid, an employer who already spends 4
170. Id. at 497 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664 (1995)).
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percent of its payroll wages toward health insurance costs would
be required under the Medicaid tax to pay the state the remaining
6 percent. However, with a shortfall tax of 50 percent, rather than
the 100 percent found in the Maryland FSA, the employer would be
able to spend only 3 percent (that is, 50 percent of 6 percent) of
payroll wages on employee health insurance to meet its require-
ment, rather than paying the full 6 percent to the state. Under this
scenario, an economic incentive in the mold of Dillingham, the lack
of a Hobson's choice would likely change the employer's cost-benefit
analysis. After all, although the court in RILA I suggested that
forcing an employer to choose between paying 100 percent to the
state or 100 percent to its employees was no choice at all, here a
significant difference exists between a company paying $1 to the
state or $.35 to $.50 to its employees.
States should adopt a tax rate on the shortfall that approximates
the highest marginal income tax for that state, 171 which usually falls
somewhere between 35 and 50 percent. When the rate is higher
than that, and especially when it is 100 percent, courts are much
more likely to view the statute as patently punitive, a reality that
played out in Judge Motz's examination. A 50-percent-and-below
rate, however, is a figure that not only looks like a normal tax or
surcharge, but it is also in line with the "indirect economic influ-
ence" language of Travelers and De Buono. A reasonable shortfall
tax on employer wages, coupled with tax credits for the state's
Medicaid financing scheme-a function within traditional state
regulation-is less punitive and operates irrespective of whether an
employer utilizes ERISA plans.
The result of a legitimate Medicaid tax with (1) a built-in tax
credit based on the employers' present health care expenditures, (2)
an exemption for employers who prefer to pay the tax funds in full
to its employees that it would have paid the state, and (3) a 35 to
50 percent shortfall tax rate, is no longer a coercive legislative
mandate. It now becomes a choice and a matter of preference to
employers. The Medicaid tax would exert an "indirect economic
influence," '172 as it did in Travelers, but this non-acute influence
171. For a listing of state individual income tax rates for tax year 2007, see Federation of
Tax Administrators, State Individual Income Tax Rates-2007, http://www.taxadmin.org/
ftalrate/ ind_inc.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
172. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659.
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would neither "bind plan administrators to any particular choice" '173
nor sufficiently "relate to" employee benefit plans. As in Dillingham,
the state statute's effect would be "merely to provide some measure
of economic incentive to comport with the State's requirements," '174
here, in the form of a Medicaid tax.
VI. APPROACH #2: MINIMUM WAGE AND 'TOTAL PACKAGE"
BENEFITS
A. Employer Size-specific Minimum Wages
One very important conclusion from the Dillingham case 75 was
that where a state law functions independently or irrespectively of
an ERISA plan, the state law does not necessarily have a sufficient
"connection with" or "refer to" an ERISA plan.'76 In Dillingham,
both ERISA and non-ERISA covered apprenticeship programs could
be approved under the California prevailing wage statute, thus the
Court found that the law was "indifferent" to ERISA even though
the vast majority of state-approved apprenticeship programs were
in fact ERISA plans.'77
A different avenue for state legislatures that hope to influence
large employer behavior, and which varies from the Medicaid tax
structuring mentioned above, is to enact employer size-specific mini-
mum wages. The creation in states of industry-neutral minimum
wage statutes that apply only to employers of a certain size is also
likely to fall into the "traditional state regulation" rubric that played
out in Travelers and its progeny.
The purpose of such a minimum wage statute would be to have
employers put money into the hands of low-income employees who
otherwise would be mathematically at risk of needing public health
insurance assistance, given subpar employer health coverage. As
stated above, the average national wages for full-time Wal-Mart
associates in fiscal year 2002 were less than $14,000 per year,
173. Id.
174. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 332 (1997).
175. See supra Part II.C.2.
176. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325-28.
177. See id. at 327 n.5.
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versus a federal poverty line of $14,630 for a family of three. 7 '
Although ensuring that the resources gained from a higher mini-
mum wage would definitely be spent on health care costs would be
impossible, it would at the very least put employees in a position to
do so. Furthermore, this approach is not coercive because it does not
in any way require the employer to interact with ERISA plans,
although it may have the direct effect of allowing individual
employees to better control their own health care needs.
A size-specific minimum wage would borrow from prevailing wage
cases, in which a standard is set for employers to pay employees
who work on certain projects or have taken part in certain pro-
grams. A state-wide prevailing minimum wage for large employers
(e.g., over 10,000 employees) is not irrational, given that many
employees for such companies are already paid according to the
federal or state minimum wage, and many of these same workers
are at a high risk, relative to other workers, of becoming part of the
state's Medicaid program. Moreover, it is also quite commonplace
for states to enact minimum wages higher than the federal govern-
ment's, as is the case in Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin.179
In many ways, requiring employers of a certain size to raise their
employee wages is not unlike New York's hospital surcharge in
Travelers or the wage differential created in Dillingham. In both of
those cases, the state tax or prevailing wage had the effect of
providing some measure of indirect economic influence or incentive;
but, it did not bind ERISA plans or lead to undue administrative
burdens. The same would be true in the case of a statute requiring
178. Bianco & Zellner, supra note 43, at 100, 102.
179. To see the specific wages in these states, see Department of Labor, Minimum Wage
Laws in the States-January 1, 2008, http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm. Note that
thirty-two states have a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage. Id. A trend
is apparent as well, given the number of minimum wage increases that were approved in 2006
through ballot measures in Arizona (66%), Colorado (53%), Missouri (76%), Montana (73%),
Nevada (69%), and Ohio (56%). See CNN.com - Elections 2006, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
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that, for example, in-state employers of more than 10,000 workers
pay $2 more than the state's present minimum wage."8 °
A provision, of course, could be written into the minimum wage
statute that would allow employers to be exempt from the higher
state minimum wage if a certain percentage of their total wages
paid to employees was spent on health insurance costs. So, if the
employer met the exemption benchmark set forth in the law, it
could revert to the state standard minimum wage. The goal of such
an exemption would be to provide an incentive to employers who
wish to invest in employee health care the money that they would
otherwise be paying to their employees in higher wages. Once again,
such an exemption provision would neither bind/refer them to
ERISA plans nor burden them. It would merely serve as a possible
way to meet a prevailing wage statute that is part of "traditionally
state-regulated substantive law in those areas where ERISA has
nothing to say."'1
B. Additional Options for Employers To Meet Minimal
Expenditures
1. Clinics and Health Savings Accounts
Under the Maryland Fair Share Act, for-profit employers could
meet the requirement of 8 percent of total wages paid to employees
on "health insurance costs" without the existence of an ERISA
plan. '2 Judge Motz, however, was not persuaded by the avenues for
doing so. As mentioned above, he quibbled with the State's conten-
tion that on-site first aid facilities would be adequate.8 3 The court
said that "[w]hile the Secretary's argument may evidence the active
180. The $2 figure is being offered here only for means of conjecture. In reality, an
appropriate minimum wage increase for affected employers would result from a calculation
of the average expenditure that the state must pay to subsidize the deficiency from the
defaulting employer.
181. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 665 (1995)).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
183. The State's argument derived from 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(c)(2) (2006), excepting from
the definition of ERISA plans "[t]he maintenance on the premises of an employer of facilities
for the treatment of minor injuries or illness or rendering first aid in case of accidents
occurring during working hours." RILA II, 475 F.3d 180, 196 (4th Cir. 2007).
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imagination of his lawyers, it is utterly out of line with reality."'"
Although Judge Motz may be correct that making up the difference
between a large company's present health insurance expenditure
percentage and 8 percent solely through the creation of new on-site
medical facilities is not practical, the building of these facilities
is nonetheless not insignificant. Moreover, although the Fourth
Circuit noted that the Department of Labor strictly interprets the
definition of such facilities not to cover a facility that treats
1'185
members of employees' families or more than "minor injuries,
Wal-Mart itself had already begun making such expenditures before
the Fair Share Act even took effect. A February 2006 Wal-Mart
News Release recounted that the employer intended to open fifty
more such clinics in 2006, and that, in the Northwest Arkansas
region alone, three clinics had already treated 4,300 patients and
administered more than 1,800 flu shots in just six months. 186 Nearly
half of all the patients treated at the three clinics cited were
uninsured.
1 87
Maryland also argued that the spending requirement could
be met through contributions to employee Health Savings
Accounts (HSAs), tax-advantaged medical savings accounts that
were established as part of Section 1201 of the 2003 Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act.' The
U.S. Department of Labor's Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1189
noted HSAs were "established to receive tax-favored contributions
by or on behalf of eligible individuals, and amounts in an HSA may
be accumulated over the years or distributed on a tax-free basis to
pay or reimburse 'qualified medical expenses.""'9
In order to establish an HSA, individuals must be covered under
a High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP), and no other more
184. RILA I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D. Md. 2006).
185. RILA II, 475 F.3d at 196 (citing Labor Dep't Op. No. 83-35A, 1983 WL 22520 (1983)).
186. Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart CEO Calls for a "New Commitment" Between
Government and Business Leaders (Feb. 26, 2006), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/
stories.pl?ACCT-109&STORY=/www/story/02-26-2006/0004300659&EDATE-.
187. Id.
188. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-79 (2003).
189. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2004-1, Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.
dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_2004-1.html [hereinafter DOL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2004-1].
190. Id.
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comprehensive health plan. This coverage can be made available by
the employer or purchased by the employee without establishing an
ERISA plan.19' In fact, the same Department of Labor guide states
that:
[W]e would not find that employer contributions to HSAs give
rise to an ERISA-covered plan where the establishment of the
HSAs, is completely voluntary on the part of the employees and
the employer does not: (i) limit the ability of eligible individuals
to move their funds to another HSA ... (ii) impose conditions on
utilization of HSA funds ... (iii) make or influence the investment
decisions with respect to funds contributed to an HSA ... (iv)
represent that the HSAs are an employee welfare benefit plan
established or maintained by the employer; or (v) receive any
payment or compensation in connection with an HSA.15 2
Wal-Mart itself has said that it offers HSAs to its associates, to
"provide yet another option for families to gain access to health
insurance and save for future health care needs.' 93 "Wal-Mart
matches associates' contributions to their HSAs dollar-for-dollar ...
and associates own the accounts. (The match ranges from $250 to
$1,000, depending on coverage level selected.)"'94
The District Court objected to this method on the grounds that
HSAs fall outside the definition of ERISA plans unless "the
establishment of the HSAs is completely voluntary on the part of
the employees."'95 Even so, for those employees who do wish to
establish HSAs, the spending would be useful and applicable under
fair share legislation. Again, although by itself such expenditures
may not be independently sufficient to meet the minimum "health
insurance costs" requirement, they nonetheless must be included in
the definition of very significant non-ERISA options.
In order for fair share legislation to be less coercive and more
palatable to employers and courts, new laws must include additional
options for meeting mandatory spending levels. The key to expand-
191. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2006).
192. DOL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2004-1, supra note 189.
193. Wal-Mart Facts, Wal-Mart's Health Care Benefits Are Competitive in the Retail
Sector, http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/1802.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
194. Id.
195. RILA 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting DOL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN
2004-1, supra note 189).
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ing the expenditure options that employers have is to present them
with numerous coherent, valid choices, but to make health insur-
ance expenditures the most attractive of all the viable avenues.
Essentially, the state must present employers with fair options that
lead under-providing members of the private sector to invest more
in either the health care of their employees or in the public health
insurance funds of the state, even if employers are not enamored of
the options.
2. "Total Package" Statutes
Logically, the greater the number of mechanisms for meeting the
statute's minimum requirements, the more likely employers (and
courts) will be to feel that they have choices. For this reason, fair
share legislation can again look to the non-ERISA preemption model
outlined in prevailing wage cases.
Prevailing wage statutes often contain both a cash component and
a benefits component. 196 Under many of these statutes, contracts for
public projects must either provide benefits contributions at the
level determined in the prevailing wage or a monetary equivalent.
As one apposite case noted:
Appellees suggest this provision creates a preemptible relation
to ERISA plans merely by providing the option of complying
with part of the minimum [prevailing] wage through benefits
contributions. We disagree. The provision does not require or
encourage an employer to provide certain benefits, to alter the
manner in which it provides benefits, or even to provide any
benefits at all. The benefits component only relates to ERISA
plans when an employer decides to satisfy it through contribu-
tions to ERISA plans instead of cash payments or contributions
to non-ERISA benefits. Where a legal requirement may be easily
satisfied through means unconnected to ERISA plans, and only
relates to ERISA plans at the election of an employer, it "affect[s]
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to'the plan."'97
196. See, e.g., 34 PA. CODE § 9.106 (2007) (setting forth standards for "[p]ayment of general
prevailing minimum wage rates").
197. Keystone Chapter, Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 960 (3d Cir.
1994) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983) (emphasis added))
(holding that the State's Prevailing Wage Act did not impede the goals of ERISA or relate to
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In one post-Dillingham case, a state law allowed employers to
meet their prevailing wage liability in any combination of benefit
plans or wages. The Second Circuit in Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v.
New York State Department of Labor (Burgio)198 examined one such
"total package" statute that "require [d] employers to match the total
cost of all prevailing supplements. Employers [we]re no longer
required to match one-for-one the specific prevailing rate for each
prevailing supplement, or even to provide each type of prevailing
supplement," '199 rather, they could meet the supplement benchmarks
through a combination of features.
With this in mind, states are able to pass "total package" fair
share laws that place a greater emphasis on non-ERISA fringe
benefits as an option for compliance. 00 Some of these benefits could
include: (1) employee discounts on qualified property or services;2 1
(2) payment for employees' business periodicals;2. 2 (3) membership
in professional associations, if the expense could have been deducted
as a business expense had the employee paid the dues herself;203 (4)
outplacement services;20 4 (5) "ordinary vacation benefits, paid out of
an employer's general assets like wages rather than out of a
dedicated fund;''2°5 (6) employer-paid club dues;20 6 (7) employer-paid
trips with specific bona fide business purposes;20 7 (8) local personal
phone calls;20. (9) occasional parties or picnics for employees and
their guests;20 9 (10) holiday gifts, other than cash, with a low fair
such plans in more than an incidental or insignificant way).
198. 107 F.3d 1000 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the prevailing wage law in question, when
used with a "total package" approach, was not preempted because it did not mandate
employee benefit structures or their administration).
199. Id. at 1004, 1010.
200. "A working condition fringe is any property or service provided to any employee of an
employer to the extent that, if the employee paid for the property or service, the amount paid
would be allowable as a deduction under [26 U.S.C. §§] 162 or 167." 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-5(a)
(2007).
201. 26 U.S.C. § 132(c)(1) (2006).
202. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(iii) (2007); id. § 1.162-1(a).
203. Id. § 1.132-5(s)(1).
204. Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51, 53.
205. RILA II, 475 F.3d 180, 190 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107, 115-16 (1989)).
206. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-5(s)(1) (2007).
207. See Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 2003).
208. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (2007).
209. Id.
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market value;21 ° (11) tuition reimbursements;2 1' (12) flexible
spending accounts;21 2 (13) employer-paid educational assistance
programs; 213 (14) transportation in connection with travel between
the employee's residence and the place of employment;21 4 and (15)
meals furnished on the business premises of the employer. 21 1 All
of these examples represent possible non-medical fringe benefits
that could serve as targets for wage supplements under a "total
package" approach. This second approach would present large em-
ployers with other fair, though perhaps not coveted, options for
their expenditures under fair share legislation. A fair share "total
package" statute could thus be written such that large employers
would be required to spend 10 percent of payroll wages on health
insurance. This 10 percent benchmark could then be met through a
combination of higher wages, numerous non-ERISA fringe benefits
expenditures, the maintenance of on-site medical facilities, and
HSAs, as well as by employers who would rather increase their
ERISA plan expenditures, or simply pay the difference to the state's
Medicaid fund.
VII. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND UNIFORM PLAN
ADMINISTRATION
As stated above, a primary purpose of ERISA is to "avoid a
multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform
administration of employee benefit plans. 21 6 This does not mean,
however, that ERISA preempts any state law that would have any
effect on an ERISA employee benefit plan. As the Second Circuit
noted in Burgio, "preemption does not occur where a state law
places on ERISA plans administrative requirements so slight
that the law 'creates no impediment to an employer's adoption of a
210. Id.
211. Id. § 1.127-2 (2007).
212. Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-2 C.B. 559. Flexible spending accounts are tax-advantaged
accounts set up through employer cafeteria plans that allow employees to set aside portions
of their earnings to pay for medical and dependent care expenses. The most common of these
plans is similar to a Health Savings Account.
213. 26 C.F.R. § 1.127-2 (2008).
214. Id. § 1.132(f)(1)(A)-(C).
215. 26 U.S.C. § 119 (2006).
216. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 657 (1995).
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uniform benefit administration scheme."'21 7 After all, "ERISA plan
expenditures are considered in the calculation of an employer's total
level of health insurance spending, but this factor does not create an
impermissible connection with an ERISA plan."'218
The vastness of a company like Wal-Mart's health insurance
plans aside,219 any requirements resulting from the fair share
legislation proposals outlined above would be a product of the
relationship between the employer and the state, and they would
function regardless of whether the employer even used an ERISA
plan in that state. Indeed, multi-state employers assume the risk of
being subject to individual state laws when they do business there.
Moreover, as one post- Travelers case noted: "[I]nformation such as
a list of plan participants, payroll lists, the amount of an employer's
contributions and the names of people for whom the employer
made contributions are appropriate areas of inquiry substantially
similar to the record production we approved in Burgio."22
Other courts have made clear that very large employers such as
Wal-Mart already keep extensive records of payroll and personnel
data,22' and that ERISA does not preempt two-tier state prevailing
wage laws just because they require ongoing calculations to
determine cash wages and total contributions to employee benefit
plans.222 For this reason, and because of the fact that Judge Motz in
RILA I did not find the FSA reporting requirements objectionable
enough to establish a "connection with" employee benefit plans,
limited reporting requirements related to employers seeking to meet
217. Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1009 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 14 (1987)).
218. RILA II, 475 F.3d 180, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., dissenting).
219. According to Wal-Mart's 2004 I.R.S. Form 5500, the Wal-Mart Associates Health and
Welfare plan utilized nearly fifty insurance companies in different states to provide benefits.
See FreeErisa.com, http://www.freeerisa.com/5500/CompanyDetail.asp?company-WAL%20
MART+STORES+INC (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
220. HMI Mech. Sys. v. McGowan, 266 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Burgio, 107 F.3d
at 1009).
221. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 180 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(discussing, in the context of a class action gender discrimination suit, Wal-Mart's
"extraordinarily sophisticated information technology system" that allows users to "create
detailed reports of individual work histories" with respect to salaries, social security numbers,
and payroll data).
222. See WSB Elec. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a public works
contractor's challenge to a California prevailing wage law that adopted a two-tier system that
calculated a cash wage and a total contribution to benefit plans).
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a Medicaid Tax exemption or a "total package" prevailing wage
statute should not trigger preemption by ERISA under any report-
ing requirements or uniform plan administration challenges.
CONCLUSION
This Note proceeds from the belief that RILA I should be read as
a veiled guide for private sector health care reform in America. In
other words, it may be seen more as a shot in the arm rather than
as a shot in the foot for health care advocates. Rather than the case
being seen as a setback for efforts to influence large employers to
provide their employees with greater access to affordable health
care, the Fair Share Act and the case that preempted it should be
viewed for the subtle opportunities they elucidate that can be built
upon.
One such subtlety that should not get lost in translation is the
efficacy of rewriting fair share legislation as state Medicaid taxes
falling under the purview of an area traditionally subject to local
regulation: public health and safety. An affirmative Medicaid tax on
large employers, designed solely for funding the state's public
health assistance programs, provisioned with tax credits and
possible exemptions for those employers who wish to invest in
employee health care what they would otherwise pay to the state,
appears very promising based on relevant Supreme Court case law.
Moreover, the reduction to a 35 to 50 percent shortfall tax on the
difference between what an employer would be required to pay the
state, and what it could instead spend on its employees in health
care costs, would give employers reasonable indirect economic
incentives to increase their employee health expenditures while not
directly "relating to" or having "connection with" ERISA plans.
Likewise, employer size-specific minimum wages have the
potential to serve as the connective tissue between indirectly
influencing large employer behavior and increasing the financial
resources available to low-income employees for their health care
expenses. Statutory exemption clauses allowing for a reversion to
the standard state minimum wage for those employers who meet a
certain percentage of payments towards health insurance costs
would also facilitate this process. Similarly, an increase in the
viable options that employers have for meeting spending require-
ments, whether through HSAs, on-site medical facilities, or non-
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ERISA fringe benefits, would detract from the argument that so few
options under the Fair Share Act lead to a Hobson's choice. Coupled
with a "total package" scheme and a prevailing wage and benefits
statute, this approach to fair share legislation could be very
formidable.
Medicaid taxes, minimum wage laws, and "total package" ar-
rangements can thus be conceived of as metals, the alloy of which
states as 'laboratories"' can employ to catalyze the process of
lessening their public health burden, while encouraging large
employers to contribute a greater proportion to employee health
care. As this prominent debate continues in political and policy
circles nationwide, it will be interesting to watch in the years ahead
as states inevitably devise new fair share proposals to shift some of
the burden of health care maintenance from the state and individ-
ual taxpayers to the private sector. What will perhaps be even more
fascinating, however, is seeing how the innovative free market in
America will respond to these proposals, most likely creating
workable solutions that preempt, in practice, the very fair share
proposals that spawned them.
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